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Chapter 12
United States of America
Erik Gerding*
1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the liability of directors under laws in the United States 
of America for misconduct or illegal actions taken by a corporation. The reader 
may fi nd this liability to be a rare phenomenon when compared to the liability 
faced by directors in the other jurisdictions surveyed in this volume. Unlike some 
jurisdictions in the world, US federal and state laws do not impose broad duties 
on directors that would hold these individuals generally liable by virtue of their 
directorial position for all violations of the law or harmful acts to third parties 
committed by the corporations they oversee. 
Instead, potential director liability for corporate misconduct, where it does exist 
in the United States, fl ows along four narrower legal channels. First, a director may 
be liable to creditors for violations of rather mechanical state corporation statutes1
designed to protect creditors. These violations include liability for obligations of a 
*  School of Law, University of New Mexico; Fellow, Department of Business Law and 
Taxation, Monash University. The author wishes to thank Eileen Gauna, Denise Fort and 
Kelly Strader for advice on environmental law aspects of this manuscript and Rose Bryan, 
and Ernesto Longa and the UNM Law Library staff for research assistance. All views and any 
errors, however, are solely the responsibility of the author. The author can be contacted at 
gerding@law.unm.edu.
1  In the United States, corporate law has generally been a matter of state not federal law, but 
exceptions abound; most notably, the Sarbanes Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002), represented a new involvement of federal law and regulation in issues of corporate 
governance. For a sampling of different scholarly views on the Act’s ‘federalization’ of 
corporate governance, see S.M. Bainbridge ‘The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law’ 
(2003) 26 Regulation, 32; and R.B. Ahdieh, ‘From “Federalization” to “Mixed Governance” 
in Corporate Law: a Defense of Sarbanes Oxley’ (2005) 53 Buffalo Law Review, 721. 
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defectively incorporated entity and prohibitions on corporations paying dividends 
to, or repurchasing shares from, shareholders when the corporation has insuffi cient 
capital.2
This liability contrasts with the second source of liability for directors – when 
a court pierces a corporation’s veil. Whereas the fi rst form of liability involves 
statutory, mechanical and rather uninteresting legal questions for courts (e.g. was a 
corporation properly formed, or were payments to shareholders made from proper 
specifi ed sources of capital), piercing the corporate veil represents common law3
in its most inchoate and perplexing form. US courts base decisions to pierce the 
corporate veil on a multitude of factors and employ rhetorical devices such as 
inquiring whether the corporation was the ‘alter ego’ of a defendant, that are more 
conclusive than explanatory in nature. The muddied analytical foundation of veil 
piercing frustrates predictions about when courts will impose the severe sanction of 
disregarding the limited liability protections of the corporate form. Yet, US courts 
remain reluctant to pierce a corporation’s veil in general, and instances in which a 
court has pierced the veil to fi nd a director or corporate offi cer liable, rather than a 
corporate or individual shareholder, are rarer still.4
But, directors may be liable for tortious acts by a corporation even absent veil 
piercing under the third channel of liability: according to principles of agency law, 
directors are directly liable for those torts committed by the corporation in which 
the director participated.5 These principles hold that an agent of a corporation who 
commits or participates in a tort may not escape liability merely because the agent 
was acting on behalf of a corporation.6
This direct liability/agency/participation theory has also infl uenced the 
interpretation and drafting of many federal and state statutes. Thus, directors may 
also incur liability for corporate statutory violations in which they participated 
2  See Part 2 below.
3  Law in the United States, like England, is originally based on the common law. The US 
Constitution, however, is the supreme law of the land and the source of all federal statutes. 
US Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The principal sources of law in the United States are the Constitution, 
federal statutes, federal administrative regulations, state constitutions, state statutes, state 
administrative regulations, municipal ordinances and regulations and common law, including 
case law. For a historical introduction to US law, see L. M. Friedman, A History of American 
Law (3rd edn, New York, Touchstone, 2005).
The interaction of common and statutory law is one of interesting subtexts of this 
chapter. In interpreting whether a statute imposes liability on directors (or offi cers), 
US courts face the choice of whether silences and ambiguities in the statutory text 
should be interpreted so as not to confl ict with common law norms or whether such an 
interpretation would frustrate a statute with broad remedial purposes. See notes 98–100 
below and accompanying text. 
4  See n. 31 below and accompanying text.
5  Some courts and commentators have erroneously confl ated this agency theory of liability 
with veil piercing. See notes 113 and 125 below.
6  Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.01. 
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provided that the statute in question at least includes individuals in the defi nition 
of ‘persons’ who may be found liable. Some federal and state statutes go a step 
further and specifi cally include directors in the list of potentially liable persons.7
With respect to either a statutory violation or a common law tort by a corporation, 
the agency theory raises the question of how direct and extensive is a director’s 
participation before he or she incurs personal liability. In a number of statutory 
contexts, courts have ruled that directors (and offi cers) must directly participate for 
liability to attach.8
However, another doctrinal strain might hold directors (and offi cers) liable for 
corporate violations of certain statutes if the directors merely have the ability to 
control the corporate conduct that leads to the violation. Directors would be liable 
under this fourth theory, labelled the ‘responsible corporate offi cer doctrine,’ even 
absent their participation in, or, in some cases, knowledge of, a statutory violation.9
Many courts have rejected applying this doctrine to new statutes without clear 
statutory language, due to, among other reasons, constitutional concerns about due 
process of law for individual defendants.10 Other courts have narrowed the scope 
of the doctrine by, inter alia, requiring that a director (or offi cer) have control over 
a specifi c corporate activity that violated a statute as opposed to general power 
to oversee a corporation in order for liability to attach.11 Narrowing the scope of 
liability brings this doctrine and the interpretation of statutes, more in line with 
the common law agency theory of liability, but at the cost of circumscribing the 
remedial nature of statutes and lowering the deterrence effect on directors.12
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part 2 briefl y discusses liability of directors 
under the fi rst legal channel described above, i.e. liability for violations of various 
mechanical provisions of state corporation statutes designed to protect creditors. 
Part 3 then briefl y outlines the piercing the corporate veil doctrine in the United 
States, particularly as it applies to directors. Part 4 then analyzes the direct liability/
agency/participation theory for director liability and looks at how legislatures 
and courts have applied this theory to statutory violations. Part 5 analyzes the 
development of the responsible corporate offi cer doctrine in the United States. 
Part 6 provides a case study of one of the most important yet confusing federal 
statutes that imposes potential massive liability on directors – the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (‘CERCLA’).13 An 
analysis of case law under CERCLA demonstrates not only how courts easily 
confuse and confl ate veil piercing with agency theories, but, moreover, how statutes 
7  See n. 56 below and accompanying text.
8  See notes 63, 65, and 105 below and accompanying text.
9  See Part 5 below.
10  See Part 7.1 below.
11  See Parts 5 and 6 below.
12  See Part 7.2 below.
13  42 United States Code §§ 9601–9675 (2008). 
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and their judicial interpretations have often defi ed easy categorization into either 
the third channel of liability – agency theories – or the fourth – the responsible 
corporate offi cer doctrine. 
Part 7 then concludes by summarizing themes in the previous Parts and 
attempting to answer the questions of why. The question is twofold: why certain 
statutes and legal doctrines impose liability on directors while others do not, and 
why director liability is relatively uncommon in the United States compared to other 
jurisdictions surveyed in this volume. In order to accomplish this, Part 7 outlines 
some of the principle policy considerations behind US laws that hold or refuse to 
hold directors liable for corporate misconduct. In particular, Part 7 analyzes how 
the rules on director liability create a perverse disincentive for directors to actively 
monitor and seek out legal violations. 
Part 7.1 briefl y notes due process concerns and normative arguments for and 
against director liability. Part 7.2 fi rst offers a public choice explanation for the 
structure of US laws that lead to the rarity of director liability. It then provides a 
broad brush analysis of certain effi ciency considerations for director liability rules, 
including the effects of director liability on deterrence of misconduct, delegation 
within a corporation, and the market for directors. Part 7.3 explores another 
economic consideration for director liability, risk-spreading, and analyzes the 
effects of insurance and indemnifi cation of directors by the corporation as allowed 
under US corporate law. Part 7.4 investigates whether corporate law and securities 
law counter the perverse disincentive created by director liability rules with respect 
to not policing corporate misconduct. Part 7.4 concludes that the fi duciary duties of 
directors serve as only the mildest corrective to this disincentive, but securities law 
liability for directors, including controversial provisions of the federal Sarbanes 
Oxley Act, may prove a more effective counterweight. 
But, before delving into this chapter, it is important to note potential sources of 
director liability on which this chapter does not focus; this chapter does not address 
the liability of directors to shareholders or to the corporation itself. Accordingly, 
this chapter does not discuss liability for breaches of the fi duciary duties directors 
owe to shareholders. Likewise, the chapter does not address the liability of directors 
when US law extends fi duciary duties to creditors while a corporation is insolvent.14
14  For an article summarizing these fi duciary duties to creditors and arguing that they should 
be triggered upon fi ling of a formal bankruptcy petition rather than upon ‘insolvency’, see
H.T.C. Hu and J.L. Westbrook, ‘Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors’ (2007) 107 
Columbia Law Review, 1321.
  Director liability for fi duciary duties to creditors has become a heated topic, as prominent 
and controversial judicial opinions have held that director may begin owing fi duciary duties 
to creditors when a corporation approaches insolvency but has not yet become insolvent. 
See, e.g. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp. 1991 WL 
277613 (Del.Ch. 30 December 1991) (unpublished opinion), reprinted in (1992) 17 Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law, 1099. See also P.M. Jones and K.H. Harris, ‘Chicken Little Was 
Wrong (Again): Perceived Trends in the Delaware Corporate Law of Fiduciary Duties and 
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Nevertheless, the extension of fi duciary duties to creditors during a corporation’s 
insolvency may represent the functional equivalent of laws in other jurisdictions in 
the world that hold directors liable for a corporation trading during insolvency.
For the same reason, this chapter does not delve into director liability to 
shareholders under federal and state securities laws. However, in Part 7.3, this 
chapter does discuss the federal securities laws that impose responsibilities on 
directors to monitor corporate misconduct. 
2 Violations of State Corporation Statutes
Other than liabilities that directors voluntarily assume when they personally 
guarantee obligations of a corporation, the most direct source of director liability 
comes from mechanical provisions in state corporation statutes designed to protect. 
Examples of these forms of individual liability for directors include the following: 
(1) obligations incurred by directors ostensibly on behalf of a 
corporation either before incorporation or in the case of a defective 
incorporation;15
(2) state corporations statutes that impose liability on directors for ultra 
vires acts by a corporation (i.e. acts not within those powers of a 
corporation specifi ed in its articles or certifi cate of incorporation);16
(3) state corporations statutes that hold directors liable to creditors for 
authorizing the payment of dividends to shareholders or the redemption 
of stock if the corporation has insuffi cient capital;17
(4) state corporation statutes that prohibit certain loans to directors;18 and
(5) state corporations statutes that prohibit dissolution of a corporation 
unless provisions have been made for obligations of the corporation.19
Standing in the Zone of Insolvency’ (2007) 16 Journal of Bankruptcy Law & Practice, 2 
Art. 2. 
15  See, e.g. Daniel A. Pouwels & Associates, Inc. v. Fiumara, 233 So.2d 16 (La. App. 4 Cir. 
1970) (offi cers and directors liable for debts incurred before incorporation); Murphy v. 
Crosland, 886 P.2d 74 (Utah App. 1994)(State corporation statute imposes liability on all 
persons who act on behalf of a corporation that has not been properly incorporated or that has 
been suspended). 
16  For example, 8 Del. C. § 124(2) (2008). 
17  For example, the Delaware General Corporations Law holds those directors who wilfully or 
negligently violate the statute’s prohibitions on declaring and paying dividends or redeeming 
or repurchasing stock unless the corporation has suffi cient capital liable to the corporation 
and creditors. 8 Del. C. §§ 160, 173, 174 (2008). See also New York Business Corporations 
Law §§ 510, 513, 719(a)(1–3) (2008).  
18  For example, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, §§ 714, 719(a)(4)(2008). 
19  Ibid. § 719(a)(3) (2008) (holding directors jointly and severally liable to the corporation for 
the benefi t of shareholders and creditors for distributing assets to shareholders after dissolution 
‘without paying or adequately providing for all known liabilities of the corporation’). 
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All of these forms of liability in this Part 2 arise from a fairly straightforward 
judicial application of statutory provisions. Yet the mechanical nature of these rules 
means that directors may sidestep liability fairly easily. For example, to avoid liability 
before proper incorporation, directors need only wait until the fairly simple steps of 
incorporation are taken before entering into contracts on behalf of the corporation. 
Directors face no risk from a corporation committing an ultra vires act if the articles 
of incorporation merely state that the corporation has all powers permitted by law.20
Many statutes that restrict the company from paying dividends to, or repurchasing 
shares from, shareholders, except out of certain sources of capital, also give the 
directors signifi cant leeway in setting the level of that capital by changing the par 
value of shares or determining what portion of shares issued for consideration other 
than cash, shall constitute capital.21 Finally, creditor-friendly statutory restrictions 
on dissolution are not triggered if the corporation never formally dissolves. 
Some states may have more restrictive corporation statutes that are more 
protective of creditors. But, it must be underscored that, in the United States, 
businesses have great latitude in choosing the state under whose laws they wish 
to incorporate.22 This has led many larger businesses to choose to incorporate in 
jurisdictions, such as Delaware, whose corporation statutes are less restrictive and 
more protective of management. This federalism in US corporate law has also 
generated a longstanding debate over whether the competition among states to 
develop laws that attract incorporations leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ or a ‘race to 
the top.’23
3 Veil Piercing and Director Liability
By contrast with those mechanical provisions of corporation states, veil piercing 
is an equitable, common law doctrine, which presents judges both great fl exibility 
and amorphous standards.24 When judges pierce the veil in the United States, 
they disregard both the legal status of a corporation as an entity separate from its 
shareholders – or, in some cases, from its offi cers or directors – and the limited 
20  Model Business Corporation Act, § 3.04, Historical Background Note 1 (‘Most of this [ultra
vires] litigation was avoidable in the sense that appropriate provisions in the original articles 
of incorporation or appropriate amendments to them broadening the scope of the purpose of 
the corporation would have validated the transactions in question’) . 
21  See e.g. 8 Del. C. § 154 (2008).
22  For example, a business that conducts all of its operations and has its headquarters in one state 
can incorporate under the laws of another state. See F.A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law (St. Paul, 
Minn. West, 2000) § 1.2. 
23  For an analysis of this debate, see L.A. Bebchuk, ‘Federalism and the Corporation: the 
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law’ (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review,
1435. 
24  R.B. Thompson, ‘Piercing the Veil: Is Common Law the Problem?’ (2005) 37 Connecticut 
Law Review, 619. 
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liability concomitant with that separation.25 The defendants thus lose the principal 
benefi t of the corporate form – the limitation of their liability for the obligations of 
the corporation to the amount of capital the defendants contributed.26
Scholars have labelled veil piercing as the most heavily litigated issue in all of 
US corporate law,27 and have surmised that it occurs more frequently in the United 
States that in other countries.28 Even so, scholars have also compared the risk of a 
corporation having the limited liability of its shareholders retracted to the chance of 
a person being struck by lightning.29 Publicly traded corporations have not suffered 
veil piercing.30
Moreover, empirical research demonstrates that equity owners – particularly 
parent corporations rather than natural person shareholders – and not directors or 
offi cers, represent the overwhelming majority of the targets of veil piercing.31 It is 
true that cases in some states have held that a defendant need not own shares in a 
corporation to be held liable for a corporation’s obligations under veil piercing.32
There are also cases in which veil piercing doctrines subjected to liability directors 
25  For an excellent empirical survey of veil piercing in the United States, see R.B. Thompson, 
‘Piercing the Corporate Veil: an Empirical Study’ (1991) 76 Cornell Law Review, 1036. 
26  S.B. Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil (New York, C. Boardman, 1991), § 1.01. 
27  See n. 25 above at 1036. 
28  See n. 24 above at 619.
29  F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, ‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’ (1985) 52 
University of Chicago Law Review, 89, 109 (characterizing veil piercing as ‘rare, severe and 
unprincipled’).
30  See n. 25 above at 1039.
31  For an empirical survey of 1,600 veil piercing cases, see n. 25 at 1058; F.H. O’Neil and 
R.B. Thompson, O’Neal’s Close Corporation: Law and Practice (3rd edn, New York, 
Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1992) § 111 n. 2. Professor Thompson reports that in only ten 
of the subset of cases in his survey not involving piercing between parent and subsidiary 
corporations did a plaintiff seek to hold a natural person liable for participating in the tort. 
In only 15 additional cases, all involving close corporations, did plaintiffs seek to hold a 
natural person liable even if he or she was not directly involved in the tort. Moreover, suits 
against natural persons were even rarer in cases in which the defendant corporation was not 
insolvent. See R.B. Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability 
of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ (1994) 47 Vanderbilt Law Review, 1, 
10–11. 
32  Non-shareholder defendants could be liable under veil piercing when they exercise extensive 
control over a corporation such that courts deem them to be the true owners of the corporation 
under the doctrine of ‘equitable ownership’. See, e.g. Freeman v. Complex Computing, 119 
F.3d 1044, 1051 (2nd Cir. 1997); Lally v. Catskill Airways, Inc. 198 A.D.2d 643 at 645, 603 
N.Y.S.2d 619 at 621 (3rd Dep’t 1993); In re MacDonald, 114 B.R. 326 at 332–33 (D. Mass. 
1990).
  A small minority of cases go a step further and label stock ownership as merely one factor 
that courts look at in deciding whether the veil should be pierced. E.g. Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. 
Armor Construction & Paving, Inc., 187 Conn. 544 at 556–57, 446 A.2d 406 at 412 (1982).
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who were not also shareholders.33 But, again, these represent a small and relatively 
uninteresting fraction of the total body of veil piercing case law.34
Veil piercing arises most frequently in the context of either liability of a parent 
corporation for a subsidiary or a closely held corporation in which the controlling 
(or sole) shareholder also serves as an offi cer and director.35 This frequent overlap 
of status in close corporations makes it diffi cult to untangle case law and articulate 
conditions for when director status alone creates a veil piercing risk. There is nothing 
to suggest that a different legal standard applies to directors other than the general 
standards courts apply in all veil piercing cases. 
However, it is diffi cult to articulate even the general standards for veil piercing. 
American scholars have lamented the deep theoretical incoherence of piercing the 
corporate veil case law.36 This incoherence stems in part from the fact that veil 
piercing, like most of corporate law in the country, is a creature of state law and 
therefore differs in each of the 50 states. Furthermore, the fact that veil piercing is, 
again, a matter of common law further complicates the analysis.37
The common law approach has led many courts to base decisions to pierce or 
not to pierce based on multi-factor tests without articulating the weight given to 
individual factors.38 Some of the more common factors cited by courts include the 
following:39
(1) was the corporation the ‘alter ego’ or ‘mere instrumentality’ of the 
plaintiff?;40
33  For example, Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251 (Ill. App. 1981) (director of non-profi t 
corporation may be found liable under veil piercing).
34  Cf. n. 31 above.
35  Thompson, n. 25 above at 1047–48. Cf. O’Neal and Thompson n. 31 above at § 1.08 at 
32 (describing how closely-held corporations concentrate both control and ownership/risk-
bearing in one set of actors, namely shareholder managers).
36  For example, Easterbrook and Fischel, n. 29 above; F.A. Gevurtz, ‘Piercing Piercing: an 
Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate 
Veil’ (1997) 76 Oregon Law Review, 853.
37  Thompson, n. 24 above (analyzing whether the fact that veil piercing is a matter of common 
law contributes to its theoretical incoherency). Texas represents one partial exception to a 
pure common law approach to veil piercing, in that the legislature of that state at least codifi ed 
which factors cannot be used by a court to pierce a Texas corporation’s veil. See Tex. Bus. 
Corp. Act Art. 2.21 (2008). 
38  Gevurtz, n. 36 above at 856–58 (criticizing this ‘template approach’).
39  For an empirical study showing the frequency that each of these individual factors was 
mentioned in cases in which courts pierced the veil, see n. 25 above at 1064–68. 
40  Under this test, if there is a suffi cient ‘unity of interest’ among the shareholder (or, in some 
cases offi cer or director) and the corporation, such that a corporation is merely the ‘alter 
ego’ of the individual, a court may pierce the veil and allow the plaintiff to look to the assets 
of the shareholder (or offi cer or director). The canonical case for this test is Walkovsky v. 
Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414; 276 N.Y.S.2d 585; 223 N.E.2d. 6 (1966). Scholars have criticized 
this factor for representing more of a rhetorical conclusion to whether defendants are liable 
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(2) defendant’s ‘domination and control’ of the corporation;41
(3) undercapitalization of the corporation;42
(4) fraud or misrepresentation by the defendant;43
(5) failure to observe corporate formalities; 44 and
(6) commingling of defendant’s assets with the corporation.45
Many courts employ additional factors in deciding whether to pierce the veil of 
a subsidiary corporation and hold the parent corporation liable. These additional 
factors include whether the two corporations have overlapping management 
(including offi cers and directors), shareholders, offi ces or business operations.46
American scholars have criticized courts for failing to apply this grab bag of 
factors in a coherent manner and to offer a clear rationale for why some defendants 
are held liable for a corporation’s obligations while others are able to take advantage 
of the corporate form and externalize the costs of operations onto creditors. In 
particular, the messy ad hoc application of the loose veil piercing factors does not 
clearly distinguish between contract creditors, who may have been able to bargain 
to avoid the loss created by a corporation, and involuntary tort creditors, who had 
no opportunity to bargain.47
than a reasoned explanation of when the veil will be pierced. Courts also employ similar 
rhetorical devices such as labelling the corporation as a ‘shell’ or ‘sham.’ Gevurtz, n. 36 above
at 855. 
41  E.g. Zaist v.Olson, A.2d 552, at 558 (Conn. 1967). 
42  Some courts look to whether the corporation was inadequately capitalized when compared to 
probable liabilities, but also fi nd that undercapitalization alone is not a suffi cient justifi cation 
for piercing. R.C. Clark, Corporate Law (New York, Aspen Law and Business, 1986) § 2.4.1. 
This, of course, raises the question of how to measure undercapitalization. 
43  For example, Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying 
Illinois law). In several states, this fraud test is diluted and a plaintiff need merely show that 
failing to pierce the veil would promote ‘inequity.’ See, e.g. Kinney Shoe Corporation v. 
Polan, 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying West Virginia law). 
44  Courts often base their veil piercing decision in part on the failure of defendants to follow 
formalities in operating a corporation, such as holding required meetings of directors and 
shareholders, keeping records and fi ling annual reports. See J.D. Cox and T.L. Hazen, Cox & 
Hazen on Corporations (New York, Aspen, 2003) § 7.09.
45  Ibid.
46  For an in-depth exploration of the law of piercing in the context of parents and subsidiaries, 
see P.I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Problems of Parent and Subsidiary 
Corporations Under Statutory Law of General Application (New York, Little Brown,1989). 
47  For example, Gevurtz, n. 36 above at 858–59 (surveying arguments on why veil piercing 
should distinguish between contract and tort creditors); R.W. Hamilton, ‘The Corporate 
Entity’ (1971) 49 Texas Law Review, 979, 984 (1971) (arguing for applying this distinction to 
rationalize veil piercing). 
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4 Direct Liability/Agency/Participation Theories
The rarity of veil piercing liability does not immunize directors, as the common 
law principles of agency present a distinct source of liability for directors.48 Under 
common law, directors are liable for torts that they commit or participate in, 
even if they are acting on behalf of a corporation.49 Similarly, acting on behalf 
of a corporation does not insulate directors and offi cers from criminal liability 
for crimes they commit.50 By contrast, directors and agents of a corporation are 
liable for contracts they enter into on behalf of the corporation only when they 
do not disclose the identity of their principal, i.e. they do not tell the contractual 
counterparty that they are contracting on behalf of a corporation or specify the 
identity of the corporation.51
Under this theory, derived from agency law on tort liability, courts have found 
that directors may be held liable for participating in corporate torts and crimes in a 
range of contexts, ranging from misappropriation of trade secrets52 to common law 
fraud and conspiracy.53
This theory of director liability extends beyond common law to statutory 
violations by a corporation. In interpreting a range of federal statutes, federal courts 
have repeatedly found that individuals, including directors, offi cers, and employees, 
can be criminally and civilly liable for statutory violations committed for the benefi t 
of the corporation.54 But, for a director to be liable, the statute must, at a minimum, 
48  Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.01 summarizes the common law rules thus:
An agent is subject to liability to a third party harmed by the agent’s tortious conduct. 
Unless an applicable statute provides otherwise, an actor remains subject to liability 
although the actor acts as an agent or an employee, with actual or apparent authority, 
or within the scope of employment. 
 The offi cial comments to that section clarify that that rule applies equally to agents of a 
corporation regardless of whether a court has or has not pierced the corporation’s veil. 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.01(d). Case law clarifi es that directors are liable for torts 
in which they participate. See n. 52–53 below. Comment (d) to the Restatement clarifi es 
that directors are liable, this despite the fact that they technically may not be agents of a 
corporation. Cf. Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of 
Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ n. 31 above at 8. 
49  E.g. Dawson v. Withycombe, 216 Ariz. 84 at 101–02 (Ariz. App. Div. 2007); see also cases 
cited in W.M. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations, Vol. 3A (Eagan, Minn. 
Thomson West, 2007), § 1137.
50  Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate 
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ n. 31 above at 7. 
51  Compare Restatement (Third) Agency § 6.01 (agent is not party to a contract when the 
principal is disclosed unless otherwise agreed) with §§ 6.02 and 6.03 (agent is liable for 
contractual obligations entered into on behalf of undisclosed or unidentifi ed principals). 
52  PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 at 678 (Ct.App. 2000). 
53  New Crawford Valley, Ltd. v Benedict, 877 P.2d. 1363 at 1368 (Colo. App. 1993). 
54  J.K. Strader, Understanding White Collar Crime (Newark, N.J., LexisNexis, 2006), 
§ 2.07(a); H. First, ‘General Principles Governing the Criminal Liability of Corporations, 
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include natural persons in the defi nition of the potentially liable, ‘persons’.55 Other 
statutes are more direct and specifi cally include ‘directors’ in a list of those who 
may be found liable.56
An exhaustive list of federal and state statutes under which directors have been 
or could be found liable is beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffi ce it to say that 
courts have found that directors may be been found civilly or criminally liable for 
authorizing or participating in the violations of statutes in a wide range of substantive 
areas of the law including the following: antitrust,57 civil rights,58 employee 
benefi ts,59 mining regulations,60 oil export restrictions,61 and tax collection.62
The potential for director liability for participating in torts or statutory violations 
by a corporation raises the question of how actively the director must participate for 
liability to attach. Increasingly, the answer is that participation must be fairly direct. 
There is a continuum of potential participation ranging from a director committing 
the tort or violation herself or himself, to ordering a subordinate in the corporation 
to commit the tort or violation, to authorizing the commission, to mere knowledge 
of the commission, to constructive knowledge and constructive participation by 
virtue of the director’s position, to strict liability. 
Courts face little diffi culty in fi nding liability in the case of a director committing, 
ordering or authorizing a tort or statutory violation.63 Strict liability and constructive 
knowledge or participation by virtue of a director’s position, discussed in Part 5 
Their Employees and Offi cers’, in White Collar Crime: Business and Regulatory Offenses, 
O. Obermaier and R. Morvillo (eds) (New York, Law Journal Press, 2006), § 5.04(1).
  In a seminal case which involved antitrust law, the Supreme Court found that a corporate 
offi cer could be criminally liable for violations of the Sherman Act notwithstanding the fact 
that the offi cer acted on behalf of a corporation. U.S. v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962). 
55  For one example of a statute that lists individuals – but does not specify directors – as 
potentially liable persons and that has been interpreted to fi nd directors liable, see the federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act analyzed in note 74 below.
56  E.g. 15 U.S.C. § 24 (2008) (‘[w]henever a corporation shall violate any of the ... antitrust laws, 
such violation shall be deemed to be also that of the individual directors, offi cers, or agents of 
such corporation who shall have authorized, ordered, or done any of the acts constituting in 
whole or in part such violation’).
57  U.S. v. Wise, 370 US 405 at 411–14 (1962)(fi nding offi cers could be held criminally liable 
for violations of predecessor statute cited in n. 56 above, even if they acted on behalf of the 
corporation).
58  Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc. 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975) 
(directors of community swimming pool liable for discrimination in violation of federal civil 
rights statutes). 
59  O’Neal and Thompson, n. 31 above at § 1.12. 
60  E.g. Commonwealth v. Evans, 45 SW.3d 442 at 443 (Ky. 2001). 
61  Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington, 826 F.2d 16 at 25 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 
1987), cert. denied, 484 US 943 (1987) (holding individual who was director, offi cer and 
shareholder could be found liable under price control statute).
62  O’Neal and Thompson, n. 31 above at § 8.22 n. 13–14.
63  Fletcher n. 49 above at § 1137. 
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below are much rarer phenomena. Many courts have ruled that liability of directors 
for corporate torts requires direct participation or negligence.64 Courts are reluctant 
to bootstrap negligence theories into imposing liability on a director solely by virtue 
of their directorial position.65
Intent is often a necessary element for liability to attach. Many traditional tort 
causes of action66 and many, but certainly not all, statutes67 imposing civil liability 
require scienter – or intent or knowledge of wrongdoing – as an element of that 
liability. Criminal statutes almost always require that the prosecutors prove that 
the defendant possessed mens rea for conviction.68 Mens rea in a given criminal 
statute might take one of the following four forms according to the simplifi ed rubric 
of the Model Penal Code: intention or purpose,69 knowledge,70 recklessness,71 or 
negligence.72
64  For example, Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Association, 42 Cal.3d 490 (1986). In that 
case, the California Supreme Court announced the following standard:
to maintain a tort claim against a director in his or her personal capacity, a plaintiff 
must fi rst show that the director specifi cally authorized, directed or participated in 
the allegedly tortuous conduct; or that although they specifi cally knew or reasonably 
should have known that some hazardous condition or activity under their control could 
injure the plaintiff, they negligently failed to take or order appropriate action to avoid 
the harm. Ibid. at 508–9.
  See also, K&G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G&G Fishing Tool Serv. 158 Tex. 594 (1958) cert. 
denied, 358 US 898 (1958) (stating, in the context of alleged trade secret theft, that Texas law 
requires that directors or offi cers are not liable for corporate misconduct by virtue of their 
offi ce, but only if they are ‘personally connected’ or participated in the misconduct); Escude 
Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902 (C.A. Puerto Rico 1980).
65  R.G. Dennis, ‘Liability of Offi cers, Directors and Stockholders under CERCLA: the Case 
for Adopting State Law’ (1991) 36 Villanova Law Review, 1367, 1413–17; O’Neal and 
Thompson, n. 31 above at § 8.22.
66  Fraudulent misrepresentation represents one example. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 526. 
67  See e.g. U.S. ex rel. Wilkins v. North American Const. Corp. 173 F. Supp.2d. 601 (S.D. Tex. 
2001) (discussing scienter requirement under False Claims Act).
68  Strader, n. 54 above at § 2.07(b). 
69  The Model Penal code sets forth the following defi nition for purposeful intent, which would 
be used to interpret statutes that require, as a mens rea standard, that the defendant act 
‘purposefully’: A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious 
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element 
involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or 
he believes or hopes that they exist. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a).
70  The Model Penal code sets forth the following defi nition for knowledge, which would be used 
to interpret statutes that require, as a mens rea standard, that the defendant act ‘knowingly’: 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the 
element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his 
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a 
result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such 
a result. Ibid. at § 2.02(2)(b). 
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Scienter and other mens rea requirements severely limit the threat of liability 
for directors of large, non-closely held corporations as state corporate law typically 
allows corporations to delegate management responsibilities to a corporation’s 
offi cers, including in bylaw provisions.73 Boards may thus legally delegate extensive 
responsibility for oversight of day to day operations to offi cers and employees. 
Thus, in a modern corporation, directors may be well insulated from participating 
or knowing about the corporate decisions that violate the law. 
5 The Responsible Corporate Offi cer Doctrine
A distinct line of cases, however, has removed the scienter and mens rea 
requirements and opened up the possibility of strict liability for directors and offi cers 
of corporations for violations of certain statutes. These cases fall under the umbrella 
of the ‘responsible corporate offi cer’ doctrine, which emerged from a seminal 1943 
US Supreme Court case, US v. Dotterweich.74 In the wake of Dotterweich, federal 
71  The Model Penal code sets forth the following defi nition for recklessness, which would 
be used to interpret statutes that require, as a mens rea standard, that the defendant act 
‘recklessly’: A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifi able risk that the material element exists or 
will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the 
nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard 
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would 
observe in the actor’s situation. Ibid. at § 2.02(2)(c).
72  The Model Penal code sets forth the following defi nition for negligence, which would be used 
to interpret statutes that require, as a mens rea standard, that the defendant act ‘negligently’: 
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifi able risk that the material element exists or will result from 
his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive 
it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, 
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe 
in the actor’s situation. Ibid. at § 2.02(2)(d).
73  For example, 8 Del. C. § 142(a) (2008). 
74  320 US 277, 64 S. Ct. 134, 88 L. Ed. 48. In Dotterweich, the Supreme Court held that a 
president and general manager of a corporation could be found guilty of a misdemeanour 
violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, which criminalized 
the adulteration or misbranding of drugs introduced into interstate commerce. 320 US at 
278 citing 52 Stat. 1040, §§ 301, 303. The Court noted that that Act dispensed with common 
requirements of mens rea and, instead, imposed a strict liability standard on any ‘person’ who 
violated the Act’s prohibition on adulteration and misbranding. 320 US at 280–81. The Act 
defi ned ‘person’ to include a corporation. Ibid. at 281 citing 52 Stat. 1040, §§ 201(e), 303. 
  The Court noted the evolution of its analysis in earlier cases that the actions and state 
of mind of a corporation’s offi cers and agents could be imputed to a corporation such that 
a corporation could be held criminally liable. 320 US at 281–82 citing New York Central 
& H.R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 US 481, (1909). Dotterweich confronted that issue in 
reverse. The Court interpreted the Act to impose liability on an offi cer ‘otherwise innocent’ 
who stood ‘in responsible relation’ to a violation of the Act. 320 US at 281. 
  A contrary holding, the Court reasoned, would have run counter to the purposes of the Act, 
and would hold no individual accountable except in cases in which the corporate veil would 
be pierced. Ibid. at 282. (holding that a narrow interpretation of the Act would mean that ‘the 
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and state courts have interpreted a range of different statutes to impose liability on 
those ‘offi cers’ – including in some cases directors75 (as well as other corporate 
employees) – who have a ‘responsible relationship to’, or a ‘responsible share of’, 
a violation of the statute by a corporation.76
The 1975 Supreme Court case US v. Park represented a particular milestone and 
perhaps the high water mark of the responsible corporate offi cer doctrine. The Park 
Court found that the same food, drug and cosmetic statute at issue in Dotterweich
did not require ‘awareness of some wrongdoing’ because that statute refl ected a 
policy decision by Congress to impose ‘not only a positive duty to seek out and 
remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement 
measures that will insure the violations will not occur.’77 In Park, the Court upheld 
the trial conviction of the chief executive offi cer of a corporation that violated the 
statute and held that:
the Government establishes a prima facie case when it introduces evidence 
suffi cient to warrant a fi nding by the trier of the facts that the defendant 
had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority 
either to prevent in the fi rst instance, or promptly to correct, the violation 
complained of, and that he failed to do so.78
The Court looked to the corporation’s bylaws – including a general provision that 
the chief executive offi cer ‘shall, subject to the board of directors, have general and 
active supervision of the affairs, business, offi ces and employees of the company’ 
penalties of the law could be imposed only in the rare case where the corporation is merely an 
individual’s alter ego.’).
  The Court found that a determination whether an offi cer or agent of the corporation would 
be criminally liable depended on ‘evidence produced at trial’ that the individual had ‘a 
responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws.’ Ibid. at 284. 
The Court refused to ‘indicate by way of illustration the class of employees which stands 
in such a responsible relation,’ as such an attempt would be ‘treacherous’ and ‘mischievous 
futility.’ Ibid. Rather, the Court entrusted such determination to ‘the good sense of prosecutors, 
the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries.’, Ibid. 
  This holding provoked a sharp dissent from four justices. The dissent found that only 
the ‘clear and unambiguous’ imposition of strict liability in a statute can justify holding 
offi cers responsible for criminal actions of a corporation without the offi cers having intent 
or knowledge of wrongdoing. 320 US at 286 (J. Murphy, dissenting) (citing ‘a fundamental 
principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that guilt is personal’.). The dissent found such clear 
and ambiguous language lacking in the statute in question. Ibid. at 287–93.
75  ‘Responsible corporate offi cers’ are not limited to ‘offi cers’ as defi ned in state corporation 
statutes, but may include directors and other agents of the corporation, provided they meet 
the relevant standards. See n. 94 below and accompanying text. 
76  In U.S. v. Park, the US Supreme Court articulated the ‘responsible share’ standard as the 
touchstone for when an offi cer or director may be held liable under the responsible corporate 
offi cer doctrine, 421 US 658 (1975). 
77  Ibid. at 672–73. 
78  Ibid. at 673–74.
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– to fi nd that the offi cer indeed had a responsible share of the violation.79 This 
ruling came despite testimony that the corporate organizational structure delegated 
operational responsibilities to other offi cers and departments.80
Subsequent federal court decisions have applied this responsible corporate offi cer 
doctrine to federal statutes in a number of substantive fi elds, including the following: 
hazardous waste clean-up,81 water pollution,82 tax law,83 controlled substances84 and 
petroleum allocation.85 Plaintiffs have also sought, with mixed success, to apply the 
doctrine to federal employee benefi ts law litigation over the failure by corporations 
to contribute to employee pension funds.86 In addition, state courts have also applied 
this federal doctrine to state statutes, including in the following areas of law: water 
pollution,87 waste disposal,88 building safety codes,89 pension contributions,90 state 
securities fraud,91 consumer fraud92 and state sales taxes.93
Despite its name, the doctrine may apply to directors as well as offi cers.94
Nevertheless, a rough survey of the cases reveals that those instances where a director 
79  Ibid. at 663.
80  The jury convicted the chief executive offi cer despite his testimony that (i) the ‘company 
had an organizational structure for responsibilities . . . according to which different phases 
of its operation,’ including sanitation ‘were assigned to individuals who, in turn, have staff 
and departments under them’; (ii) he investigated reported violations; and (iii) he ordered 
corrective steps when he learned of these violations. Ibid. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
81  See Part 6 below. 
82  U.S. v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2001)(applying doctrine to Clean Water Act).
83  Thomsen v. U.S., 887 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1989)(holding treasurer and vice-president of closely 
held corporation liable as ‘responsible person’ for failure to remit taxes to government). 
84  U.S. v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1985). 
85  U.S. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 408 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. Pa 1975). 
86  Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate 
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ n. 31 above at 24. 
87  State, Dep’t of Environmental Protection v. Standard Tank Cleaning Corp., 284 N.J. Super. 
381 (App. Div. 1995); BEC Corp. v. Dep’t of Environmental Protection, 256 Conn. 602 
(2001); State, Dep’t of Ecology v. Lundgren, 94 Wash. App. 236 (Div. 2 1999); B.J. Monachino 
‘Courts May Find Individuals Liable for Environmental Offenses without Piercing Corporate 
Shield’ (May, 2000) 72 New York State Bar Journal 22, 33. 
88  Commissioner, Dept. of Environmental Management v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 
2001); In Matter of Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Matthews, 
7 Ca. App. 4th 1052 (2d Dist 1992).
89  People ex rel. Volberg v. Durch, 530 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1988). 
90  O’Neal and Thompson, n. 31 above at §8.22. 
91  Wittenberg v. Gallagher, 2001 WL 34048121 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001). 
92  State ex rel. Miller v. Santa Rosa Sales and Marketing, Inc., 475 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1991). 
93  State v. Longstreet, 536 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
94  Commission, Dept. of Environmental Management v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 2001); 
Paper-Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers Intern. Union v. Sherman Lumber 
Co., 2001 WL 1719233 (Me. Super. Ct. 2001). 
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who was not also an offi cer of the corporation has been found civilly or criminally 
liable under the responsible corporate offi cer doctrine represent a relatively small 
fraction of the total. Part of the explanation for this may be prosecutorial decisions 
to pursue cases against offi cers who are more directly involved in statutory 
violations. But, a more compelling explanation, explained further below, is that 
courts subsequent to Park have taken a much narrower view of when a director or 
offi cer has responsibility for a violation.
Indeed, Dotterweich and Park left two important questions unanswered. First, to 
which statutes would the responsible corporate offi cer doctrine apply, and second, 
under what circumstances could a director have a ‘responsible share’ in a statutory 
violation and thus be a ‘responsible corporate offi cer’? 
With respect to the fi rst question, recent cases indicate that federal courts will 
demand that the language of a statute be very explicit for the responsible corporate 
offi cer doctrine to apply. In the 2003 decision in Meyer v. Holley,95 the US Supreme 
Court rejected a contention that the federal Fair Housing Act96 imposed liability on 
the sole shareholder and president of a real estate corporation for an employee’s 
violation of that statute’s prohibition on housing discrimination practices.97 The 
Court focused on the language of the statute and a related agency regulation 
and found neither explicitly created liability for an offi cer or sole shareholder 
of a corporation.98 Moreover, the Court characterized Dotterweich as applying 
‘unusually strict’ and ‘non-traditional’ rules of vicarious liability, and underscored 
that the Court would apply such rules only ‘where Congress has specifi ed that such 
  In U.S. v. Ming Hong, the Fourth Circuit found that even a person who was not a formal 
offi cer or director of a corporation, could be held liable for violations of the Clean Water Act 
as a ‘responsible corporate offi cer.’ 242 F.3d 528 at 531 (4th Cir. 2001) (‘the gravamen of 
liability as a responsible corporate offi cer is not one’s corporate title or lack thereof; rather, 
the pertinent question is whether the defendant bore such a relationship to the corporation 
that it is appropriate to hold him criminally liable for failing to prevent the charged violations 
of the [Clean Water Act]’). The Court found that, despite the fact that the defendant ‘avoided 
any formal association’ with the corporation that violated the statute and that he ‘was not 
identifi ed as an offi cer of the company,’ he ‘substantially controlled corporate operations.’ 
Ibid. at 530 at 532. 
95  537 U.S. 280 (2003).
96  42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (2008).
97  Meyer, 537 U.S. at 289–91. 
98  Ibid. at 286–88. The court found that the language in the agency regulation would hold the 
corporation but not the sole-shareholder/president personally liable. The regulation said 
that complaints to the agency that the statute was violated may be fi led, against any person 
who directs or controls, or has the right to direct or control, the conduct of another person 
with respect to any aspect of the sale of dwellings … if that other person, acting within the 
scope of his or her authority as employee or agent of the directing or controlling person 
has engaged … in a discriminatory housing practice. Ibid. at 288 citing 24 CFR §103.20(b) 
(1999) (repealed)(emphasis in the court opinion not in the regulation). 
  Thus, for a shareholder, director or offi cer to be liable, the employee would have had to have 
been acting as agent for that shareholder, director or offi cer rather than for the corporation.
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was its intent.’99 Thus, Meyer signalled that federal courts should not apply the 
corporate responsible offi cer doctrine in the absence of clear Congressional intent; 
clear statutory language is necessary to dispense with mens rea and hold directors 
and offi cers strictly liable for corporate misconduct.100
Although Meyer signals that federal courts will not extend liberally the responsible 
corporate offi cer doctrine to new statutes, it does not roll back existing case law 
applying the doctrine to specifi c federal statutes, nor does it affect interpretation 
and application of the doctrine by state courts to state statutes. Moreover, in an 
interesting cross-pollination of common law and statute, a number of federal and 
state statutes have explicitly incorporated the doctrine by including ‘responsible 
corporate offi cers’ or similar concepts in the defi nition of persons liable. Among 
the federal statutes in this category are the following: provisions in the tax code,101
the Clean Water Act102 and the Clean Air Act.103 (In addition, federal securities laws 
include provisions holding ‘control persons’ liable for certain violations.104)
Just as Meyer constricted the criteria for application of the doctrine to statutes, 
so too, with respect to the second question, have recent federal cases narrowed the 
criteria for who may be a responsible corporate offi cer. These cases have taken a 
much more restrictive view of when a director or offi cer has a ‘responsible share’ 
of a violation, by requiring that the director or offi cer have more direct oversight 
of the specifi c operations of a corporation that led to the violation.105 These cases 
represent a signifi cant reversal in course from Park, which suggests that, if directors 
have ultimate responsibility for all the affairs of a corporation, they might be liable, 
even if they delegated supervisory responsibility for specifi c areas of the business 
to offi cers and others.106
This reversal means that, in determining whether a director had a ‘responsible 
share’ of a violation, a court might give less weight than Park did to evaluating an 
individual’s general authority under both the statute under which the corporation is 
99  Meyer, 537 U.S. at 287, 289. 
100  Cf. United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Company, 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(holding that explicit ‘knowing’ requirement for criminal liability under hazardous waste 
disposal statute could not be obviated by responsible corporate offi cer doctrine).
101  More specifi cally, the tax code imposes liability on ‘responsible persons’ for failure to pay 
employment taxes. 26 USC §§ 6671, 6672 (2008). For a case in which a director, who had 
substantial operational control over a corporation’s fi nances (including the ability to borrow 
money on behalf of the entity), was held liable under this statute, see Jenson v. U.S., 23 F.3d 
1393 (8th Cir. 1994). 
102  33 USC § 1319(c)(6) (2008).
103  42 USC § 7413(h) (2008). 
104  15 USC § 77–o (2008).
105  Strader, n. 54 above at §7.02(c) (‘a “responsible” corporate offi cer is one who possessed 
supervisory responsibilities for the matter in question.’). 
106  See n. 79–80 above and accompanying text. 
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organized, and the corporation’s certifi cate of incorporation and bylaws.107 A court 
would likely focus more on whether statutes and a corporation’s organizational 
documents task a director with more direct oversight of the particular area of a 
corporation’s operations involved in legal misconduct. Moreover, a court might 
look at actual day-to-day activities and responsibilities of a director. 
6 A Case Study: CERCLA
CERCLA presents one of the single most signifi cant statutory sources of potential 
liability for directors. This act also has spawned the most extensive and convoluted 
case law on director and offi cer statutory liability, and thus represents an ideal lens 
with which to compare veil piercing, agency and responsible corporate offi cer 
theories. 
This statute, which Congress passed in 1980 in the wake of the Love Canal 
disaster, regulates the clean-up of land contaminated by hazardous waste, also 
known as ‘Superfund’ sites.108 To pay for this clean-up, CERCLA holds strictly 
liable persons who: 
(1) currently own or operate a facility where hazardous substances have 
been released into the environment; 
(2) formerly owned or operated a facility when hazardous substances were 
disposed of at that facility; or 
(3) generated or arranged for disposal or treatment of a hazardous substance 
that was released into the environment.109
Liability, once it attaches to these persons, is strict, joint and several.110 Under 
the Act, ‘persons’ includes individuals, corporations and other business entities.111
But, the Act defi nes both ‘owner’ and ‘operator’ only in a tautological manner.112
Thus federal courts have been forced into the breach to defi ne these terms and 
determine when individual defendants – directors, offi cers, employees and agents 
107  Although many state corporations statutes vest the responsibility of managing the business and 
affairs of a corporation in the board, statutes also provide that the certifi cate of incorporation 
or bylaws may give signifi cant managerial responsibility to offi cers. See, e.g. 8 Del. C. §§ 109, 
141 (2008). 
108  For background on CERCLA and a recent analysis of the state of the responsible corporate 
offi cer doctrine under the statute in the wake of the Bestfoods case (analyzed below) see B. 
Moore ‘The Corporate Offi cer as CERCLA Operator: Applying the Holding in United States 
v. Bestfoods to the Determination of Offi cer Liability’ (1999) 12 Tulane Environmental Law 
Journal, 519. 
109  42 USC § 9607(a)(1)–(3)(2008).
110  Moore, n. 108 above at 526. 
111  42 USC § 9601(21)(2008). 
112  42 USC § 9601(20)(A)(ii)(2008). 
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– may be liable as ‘owners’ or ‘operators’ (or in some cases as ‘arrangers’) for 
the CERCLA violations of a corporation. In doing so, federal courts have applied 
– often confusing and confl ating – each of the veil piercing, direct liability/agency/
participation and responsible corporate offi cer doctrines.113
Within direct liability CERCLA theories for holding directors, offi cers and 
shareholders liable, courts have historically taken wildly different approaches. The 
most common approach has been to hold directors, offi cers and shareholders liable 
as ‘operators’ for CERCLA violations in which they directly participate.114 But, 
several federal trial and appellate courts went a step further and held that directors 
and offi cers could be liable for violations of the statute if they had the ‘capacity 
to control’ those operations in the facility that led to the violations, regardless of 
whether they knew or directly participated in violations.115
A few courts went yet further by ‘eliminating the requirement that the particular 
harm in question have any relation to areas within such person’s capacity to 
control.’116 One scholar argues that a series of cases pushed the envelope and 
‘focused on the defendant’s general participation in the management of the facility, 
or even the management of the corporation.’117 In describing this progression, this 
scholar noted, ‘[c]ompletely lost… are the concepts of active participation in the 
management of the facility or personal participation in the wrongful act that caused 
the damage.’118
This difference between the ‘direct participation’ and ‘capacity to control’ 
theories of CERCLA case law parallels the differences between the ‘direct liability/
participation’ theory of liability and the ‘responsible corporate offi cer’ doctrine 
outlined in Parts 4 and 5 of this chapter. At the same time, the range of CERCLA 
standards on ‘capacity to control’ mirrors the spectrum in the ‘responsible offi cer’ 
doctrine with respect to the question of how particularized must a responsible 
offi cer’s oversight responsibilities be for he or she to have liability for a statutory 
violation. However, characterizing CERCLA cases on a continuum also masks the 
113  See Dennis, n. 65 at 1375–1410. Dennis analyzes how courts have confused veil piercing 
with direct participation theories, by seeming to imply that direct participation is a method to 
pierce the veil. Ibid. at 1377, n. 40 citing NEPACCO I, 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 US 848 (1987).
114  Moore, n. 108 above at 526–28; L.J. Oswald and C.A. Schipani, ‘CERCLA and the “Erosion” 
of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine’ (1992) 86 Northwestern University Law Review, 259 
(1992); C.A. Schipani, ‘Integrating Corporate Law Principles with CERCLA Liability for 
Environmental Hazards’ (1993) 18 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 1, 5. 
115  This is also known as the ‘authority to control’ test. See Moore, n. 108 above at 533–40. 
Moore distinguishes cases in which courts based director and offi cer liability determination 
on whether the individual had ‘actual control’ over hazardous substances from those that used 
an ‘authority to control’ test. Ibid. at 529–40.
116  Dennis, n. 65 above at 1387–88. 
117  Ibid. at 1388. 
118  Ibid. at 1389.
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fact that many of the cases lacked logical coherency and may fall at once on various 
points on the spectrum.119
In 1998, the Supreme Court re-entered the fray over CERCLA in U.S. v. 
Bestfoods;120 and provided much needed clarity to the analysis of the three doctrines: 
veil piercing, direct liability/participation liability and responsible corporate offi cer 
liability. Even though the case involved liability of a parent corporation for a 
subsidiary, its holdings would likely also apply to director and offi cer liability under 
the statute. Three fi ndings stand out – fi rst, the Bestfoods opinion held that a parent 
corporation could be liable as an owner or operator under CERCLA under a veil 
piercing theory, but only if the common law rules for veil piercing apply; the statute 
did not create a new veil piercing standard.121
Second, the opinion clarifi ed that a parent may be liable, even absent veil 
piercing, under a direct participation theory.122 The Court thus underscored the 
critical distinction between veil piercing and agency/participation theories outlined 
in this chapter. But, Bestfoods held that for a parent corporation to be liable under 
CERCLA, it must participate directly in the operation of the violating facility, not 
merely in the operations of the violating subsidiary.123 Mere overlap of directors 
between the parent and subsidiary is insuffi cient to fi nd direct participation, as the 
Court reasoned,
[a]ctivities that involve the facility but which are consistent with the 
parent’s investor status, such as monitoring of the subsidiary’s performance, 
supervision of the subsidiary’s performance, supervision of the subsidiary’s 
fi nance and capital budget decisions, and articulation of general policies and 
procedures, should not give rise to direct liability.124
Again, Bestfoods analyzed parent/subsidiary liability, but it nevertheless sends a 
strong signal as to how the Court would rule on matters of the liability of individual 
directors and offi cers under CERCLA. The Court was unequivocal that liability as 
an ‘operator’ under a participation theory required very direct participation in the 
operation of the facility, not of the corporation as a whole. For directors to be liable 
as operators, it would seem they too would need to have directly participated in 
operating the facility.125
119  Ibid. at 1376.
120  524 US 51 (1998). 
121  Ibid. at 62–64. The Court recited some of the usual tests for veil piercing, but did not specify 
the weight that would be given to each nor did it settle whether state or federal common law 
on veil piercing should apply in CERCLA veil piercing cases. Ibid. at 64. 
122  Ibid. at 64-65. 
123  Ibid. at 67-68. 
124  Ibid. at 72 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
125  Some courts and scholars have also made this conclusion. See Moore, n. 108 above at 544–50 
citing U.S. v. Green, 33 F. Supp.2d 203, 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). Moore also notes that some 
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7  Conclusion: Towards an Explanation for the Structure of 
Director Liability Rules in the United States
Bestfoods serves as a bellwether for the current state of the three most important 
sources of director liability outlined in this chapter. Veil piercing continues as an 
important corporate law doctrine, but continues to suffer from uncertainty as to its 
core principles. Complicating the analysis, cases in which directors have been held 
liable under veil piercing without also being shareholders and offi cers remain rare. 
Directors also face liability for torts and statutory violations in which they 
participate, but courts increasingly require fairly direct participation for liability to 
attach. The responsible corporate offi cer doctrine survives as an alternative source 
of liability for directors and courts may dispense with requirements that directors 
have actual knowledge of, or intent to commit misconduct. Yet federal courts appear 
unwilling to extend this doctrine to new statutes absent clear statutory language. Even 
within the responsible corporate offi cer doctrine, courts have moved to requiring 
that directors and offi cers have fairly particularized oversight responsibility for the 
specifi c operations that led to a violation for liability to attach. 
Several deeper legal trends and themes lie underneath the movement in these 
three doctrines. First, director liability under both participation and responsible 
corporate offi cer doctrines appears to be a more signifi cant risk in closely held 
corporations in which directors are also often offi cers and shareholders and are 
much more involved in the daily affairs of the corporation.126 This parallels veil 
piercing, which, as noted above, does not occur in the context of publicly traded 
corporations.127
Second, courts appear less creative in invoking criminal liability rather than 
civil; for example, courts are much less willing to dispense with the core criminal 
law requirement of mens rea than they are with civil law scienter.128 Third, there 
is a continued movement of federal courts towards a strict construction of statutes 
and away from implying remedies.129 This movement has given new vitality to the 
canon of statutory construction which says that judges must strictly construe statutes 
courts seem to have misinterpreted Bestfoods to mean that directors and offi cers can only be 
liable when the corporate veil is pierced. Ibid. at 547 citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Ter 
Maat, 13 F.Supp.2d 756, 763–65 (N.D.Ill. 1998).
126  O’Neal and Thompson, n. 31 above at § 1.12. 
127  See n. 30 above and accompanying text. 
128  See MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d 35 at 51–52 (expressing less willingness in context of 
criminal statutes to use responsible corporate offi cer doctrine to override explicit knowledge 
requirements for individual liability). 
129  For a historical analysis of the evolution of statutory interpretation in the United States, see
W.D. Popkin, Statutes in Court: the History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation (Durham, 
Duke University Press, 1999). Popkin describes the dominant mode of statutory interpretation 
in the twentieth century up until the 1960s as ‘purposive’, but then describes a shift to ‘modern 
textualism’ that looked to reduce the interpretative role of judges. Ibid. at 115–188. 
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that derogate from common law – which usually means pre-20th century common 
law.130 At the same time, the dominant view looks to limit mid-20th century case 
law interpreting statutes (itself a form of common law) where courts were more 
willing to see in statutes evidence of legislative intent to provide remedies where 
the common law was insuffi cient. 
These judicial trends cannot deny that statutes in a few areas of law, most notably 
environmental law, have explicit and historically novel provisions to hold directors 
and offi cers liable for corporate misconduct. These trends have also not reversed 
earlier novel judicial interpretations fi nding individual liability under certain food 
and drug statutes. 
But, what explains why these substantive areas of the law are more open to 
director liability? Perhaps statutes in these areas merely refl ect the more progressive 
eras in which they were enacted or public demand for legal redress in the wake of 
corporate scandals. Alternatively, it might be that the harms addressed by these 
statutes are greater in magnitude and affect a greater number of people, and, 
therefore, greater deterrence of directors and offi cers is warranted. Indeed, courts 
have often remarked that the strict liability regime of the responsible corporate 
offi cer doctrine applies only to a narrow class of ‘public welfare’ statutes.131
But, directors and offi cers might also face more liability under environmental 
law than, say, employee benefi ts law132 for the same effi ciency reasons that scholars 
advocate differing standards for tort and contract creditors in veil piercing cases: the 
victims of environmental liability have far less ability to avoid and bargain out of 
losses and thus bear a clearer resemblance to tort creditors. 
In any event, various legal doctrines together ensure that directors face far less 
liability for corporate misconduct than in other countries surveyed in this volume. 
Why is this? This may refl ect the structure of US corporate law which not only 
gives directors great discretion in making decisions, but allows them to delegate 
more responsibility to offi cers and employees of the corporation. Directors of US 
corporations may thus be more removed from much of corporate decision-making 
and thus more insulated from liability for corporate misconduct than directors of 
corporations in other countries.
130  For scholarship explaining and supporting this canon, see, e.g. J.R. Stoner Jr, ‘The Idiom 
of Common Law in the Formation of Judicial Power’ in The Supreme Court and American 
Constitutionalism, B.P. Wilson and K. Masugi (eds) (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefi eld, 
1998).
131  E.g. Celentano v. Rocque, 282 Conn. 645, 671 (2007). 
132  Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate 
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ n. 31 above at 28–29 (noting that pension cases appear 
to require more direct participation by an individual for liability compared to CERCLA cases 
and speculating this is because collective labour bargaining means ‘there would have been 
some theoretical chance to bargain for individual liability’). See also Dennis, n. 65 above at 
1394–96 (citing numerous ERISA cases rejecting individual liability).
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Yet, that is a descriptive, not a normative statement, and does not answer the 
question of why US law gives directors greater insulation from decision-making 
and liability. It only raises the question – why should US law not expect directors 
to take a more active role in preventing at least the most serious forms of corporate 
misconduct?
The structure of the rules for holding directors liable creates a disincentive for 
directors to actively monitor and police corporate operations for potential legal 
misconduct. As noted above, many criminal and civil statutes require knowledge by 
a defendant of a legal violation for liability to attach to that individual.133 Even under 
strict liability statutes, application of the responsible corporate offi cer doctrine to 
a director generally requires the director to have oversight responsibility for the 
particular operations of the business that violated the statute.134 Directors may, 
therefore, be reluctant to monitor operations with a high risk of statutory violations 
for fear of being held liable for this misconduct by virtue of their knowledge or 
management. The extent to which these perverse incentives actually change director 
behaviour requires empirical study.135
On the other hand, holding directors liable for corporate misconduct would 
create an incentive for them to detect and reduce the level of corporate lawbreaking. 
Considered in isolation, this incentive would be clearly desirable. But, director 
liability also comes with costs. Part 7.1 sketches due process and normative 
arguments with respect to not holding directors liable. Part 7.2 considers economic 
explanations – both public choice and effi ciency – for why directors are not held 
liable more often. Part 7.3 outlines the effects of director liability on risk-spreading 
and, conversely, the impact of corporate insurance and indemnifi cation on rules 
imposing director liability. Part 7.4 analyzes the extent to which corporate and 
securities laws serve as a counterweight to the disincentive for directors to monitor 
created the by the rules described above in this chapter. Part 7.5 offers a concluding 
analysis.
7.1. DUE PROCESS AND NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS
Concern for the constitutional due process of individuals clearly animates the 
legislative and judicial reluctance to hold directors and offi cers liable in the absent 
direct knowledge or participation in corporate misconduct. Strict liability and the 
responsible corporate offi cer doctrine are the exceptions not the norms. This due 
133  See n. 66–70 above and accompanying text. 
134  See n. 105 above and accompanying text.
135  One potential way to measure these disincentives would be to compare corporate governance 
metrics (such as those created by investor activist groups) for companies in an industry 
with higher potential director liability due to statute (for example, hazardous waste disposal 
companies with CERCLA exposure) with a control group of companies. 
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process concern is particularly intense in criminal law cases, as deep norms embedded 
in criminal law require that criminal liability match individual culpability.136
But, this does not necessarily end the analysis of why directors are not held 
liable. One could imagine a set of rules that would hold directors liable even absent 
direct participation or knowledge and that would nonetheless accord with norms of 
culpability, if the background expectation of corporate law was that directors should 
be actively involved in corporate decision-making and monitoring of misconduct. 
7.2  ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS: RENT-SEEKING, DETERRENCE, 
DELEGATION AND THE MARKET FOR DIRECTORS
The question then becomes, why does US corporate law not expect this level of 
engagement from directors? One economic explanation rooted in public choice 
theory is that directors and other corporate managers have engaged in rent-
seeking behaviour to take advantage of legal rules to insulate themselves. Under 
this explanation, directors and corporate management in general have chosen to 
incorporate (or move the state of incorporation) in states whose laws provide them 
with maximum fl exibility in decision-making and delegation. This not only insulates 
directors and offi cers from liability to shareholders, but has the collateral benefi t 
of reducing their responsibility for corporate misconduct affecting third parties or 
the public. This explanation represents a version of the ‘race to the bottom’ theory 
of the competition among states for incorporations.137 Moreover, directors and 
management can use the resources of the corporation available to them to infl uence 
the development of the law, including through corporate campaign contributions.
In an altogether different intellectual vein, one could take seriously the idea 
that economic effi ciency shapes not only corporate law, but the rules for director 
liability outlined above. Applying economic logic, the law should hold directors 
(and offi cers) liable for corporate misconduct only when liability actually deters that 
misconduct. But, holding directors liable may lead to over-deterrence if directors 
cannot effi ciently bear risk.138 Moreover, if directors have little direct control over 
the operations of a corporation that cause social loss, then it would be severely 
ineffi cient to hold them liable for those losses.
Again, this begs the question of whether the hierarchy of corporate decision-
making in which directors are not intimately involved in operations should be taken 
as immutable. If directors were held liable, they would likely become much more 
involved in corporate decision-making to detect and thwart misconduct in order to 
mitigate their legal exposure as individuals. This would undoubtedly reduce the 
incidence and magnitude of corporate misconduct. 
136  Strader, n. 54 above at § 2.07(b).
137  See n. 23 above and accompanying text. 
138  Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate 
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ n. 31 above at 27. 
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It would also come with several costs. First, directors may become much 
more risk averse in their decisions. The extent of this risk aversion and whether 
it would lead to suboptimal decision-making or merely remedy a moral hazard of 
directors remains an open question and warrants further empirical study. Second 
and similarly, increased liability might encourage directors to micromanage their 
subordinates, thereby erasing the effi ciency gains of delegation within the fi rm. The 
extent to which this would happen and the net social loss that would occur if it did, 
again, require empirical research in order to move beyond theoretical speculation.
Third, increased liability might simply drive individuals out of the market for 
directors. Even worse, it might create a ‘lemons’ problem by driving more risk 
averse, cautious and law-abiding persons out of the market for directors and leaving 
the pool for directorships full of more aggressive and less scrupulous individuals. 
These theoretical costs of increasing director liability for corporate torts and 
statutory violations mirror the arguments made against increasing director liability 
to shareholders under either fi duciary duties of corporate law or securities law. 
Nevertheless, even scholarly arguments on the effects of increased director liability 
on the market for directors often represent theoretical assertions or are based 
largely on anecdote; sound empirical validation of these assertions remains a work 
in progress.139 But, as with any empirical research in corporate and fi nancial law, 
untangling the skein of causal links proves extremely diffi cult. 
7.3 RISK-SPREADING, INSURANCE AND INDEMNIFICATION
The effects of liability on director incentives – including the deterrence value of 
liability rules – are blunted to the extent directors are indemnifi ed or insured for that 
liability. Most state corporation statutes allow corporations to indemnify directors 
for civil and criminal liability. For lawsuits, other than those involving liability 
to the corporation and shareholders, the corporation typically may pay not only a 
director’s expenses (such as attorneys’ fees), but judgments, fi nes and settlement 
amounts as well. Statutory conditions for indemnifi cation in these cases are often not 
particularly onerous. For example, Delaware law allows corporations to indemnify 
a director so long as he or she:
139  For a sample of arguments in the literature of the effects of increased liability on the market 
for directors, see A. Hamdani and R. Kraakman, ‘Rewarding Outside Directors’ (2007) 105 
Michigan Law Review, 1677, 1690; B. Black, ‘Outside Director Liability’ (2006) 58 Stanford 
Law Review 1055, 1058 (2006) citing R. Romano, ‘What Went Wrong with Directors’ and 
Offi cers’ Liability Insurance?’ (1989) 14 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 1, 1-2.
  Several studies have attempted to measure the effects of liability on the market through 
surveys; e.g. J. Sarra, ‘Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets: Canadian and 
International Developments’ (2002) 76 Tulane Law Review 1691, 1700 (2002) (critiquing 
one such survey). Survey research presents obvious biases. 
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acted in good faith and in a manner [the director] reasonably believed to be 
in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect 
to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe the 
[director’s] conduct was unlawful.140
Moreover, corporations may purchase insurance for directors to cover those 
liabilities that corporations may be statutorily prohibited from indemnifying.141 Of 
course, corporate insolvency can limit the value of indemnifi cation and directors 
and offi cers’ insurance policies have coverage limitations that may leave directors 
exposed for breaches of certain laws or for intentional misconduct; many insurance 
companies explicitly carve out CERCLA liability from coverage under director and 
offi cer policies.142
The presence or absence of indemnifi cation and insurance complicates that 
analysis of another economic objective, risk-spreading. Risk-spreading refl ects the 
objective of allocating losses to a party that can most bear the losses most effi ciently. 
In other words, losses should be allocated to the best ‘insurer’. Often the party that 
can best bear losses is the one that can pass losses on to a wide number of other 
persons.143 Scholars have argued that risk-spreading argues against holding directors 
and offi cers liable, as individuals are less able to diversify away this liability.144
This conclusion would change though if directors benefi ted from indemnifi cation 
or insurance, which would allow risks to be spread to the corporation and insurance 
providers.
On the other hand, risk-spreading via indemnifi cation and insurance creates 
the potential for moral hazard and compromises the deterrence value of director 
liability. Indemnifi cation and insurance also pose agency costs as directors seek 
to pass to shareholders losses for misconduct. Moreover, risk-spreading obtained 
through director liability with indemnifi cation and insurance raises the question of 
whether the same result could be achieved more directly by holding the corporation 
liable and dispensing with director liability altogether.
140  8 Del. C. § 145(a). Compare this to §145(b) which allows a corporation to indemnify directors 
for actions ‘by or in the right of the corporation’ but excludes indemnifi cation if the director is 
adjudged liable.
141  E.g. 8 Del. C. § 145(g). Many statutes, including CERCLA, allow corporations to indemnify 
individuals. See e.g. U.S. v. Lowe, 29 F.3d 1005 (5th Cir. 1994).
142  W.S. Biel, ‘Comment: Whistling Past the Waste Site: Directors’ and Offi cers’ Personal 
Liability for Environmental Decisions and the Role of Liability Insurance Coverage’ (1991) 
140 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 241.
143  Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate 
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ n. 31 above at 3. 
144  Ibid. at 3–4.
 GERDING: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 327
7.4  CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW COUNTERWEIGHTS TO THE 
DISINCENTIVES TO DIRECTOR MONITORING.
To the extent that the director liability rules outlined in this chapter do create a 
disincentive for directors to closely supervise businesses and correct illegal acts, 
US corporate law presents only a mild corrective. Historically, the fi duciary duty 
of care has imposed a general obligation on directors to attend meetings, become 
familiar with the nature of the corporation’s business and monitor its operations.145
But, liability for duty of care obligations is blunted by deference directors are given 
under the business judgment rule.146
However, over a decade ago, the Delaware Court of Chancery (arguably the most 
infl uential state court for corporate law) increased the duties of directors to monitor 
corporate operations for potential illegal conduct in the In re Caremark International 
Inc. Derivative Litigation case.147 Caremark articulated two obligations of boards 
of Delaware corporations. First, boards must monitor the corporation to ensure that 
it is complying with the law. This obligation includes responsibility for designing 
management and information systems that ensure that employees detect and report 
non-compliance with the law to superiors and that information on non-compliance 
percolates up to the board.148 Second, the Board must sift through the information 
145  See, e.g. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 NJ 15 (1981). 
146  Professor Clark explains the deference courts give to business decisions of directors and 
offi cers in the face of lawsuits alleging duty of care violations thus, the business judgment of 
the directors will not be challenged or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the directors 
will not be held liable for the consequences of their exercise of business judgment – even for 
judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes – unless certain exceptions apply. Clark, 
n. 42 above at 123. 
  Clark then elaborates that these exceptions consist of acts by the directors that constitute 
fraud, illegality and confl ict of interest or, according to some courts and scholars and in 
limited circumstances, gross negligence. Ibid. at 124. 
147  698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.1996). For a comprehensive analysis of Caremark and its progeny, see
H.A. Sale, ‘Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith’ (2007) 32 Delaware Journal of Corporate 
Law,  719. 
148  The Chancery Court opinion set the standard for when a board breached its duty to monitor. 
The opinion found that a board of directors could not, satisfy their obligation to be reasonably 
informed concerning the corporation, without assuring themselves that information and 
reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to 
senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information suffi cient to allow 
management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning 
both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance. Caremark, 698 
A.2d at 970.
  At the same time, the opinion indicated that courts would be deferential as to the design of 
information systems, particularly as to the extent of information that would be reported up the 
ladder to the board. 
  Obviously the level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system is a question 
of business judgment. And obviously too, no rationally designed information and reporting 
system will remove the possibility that the corporation will violate laws or regulations, or that 
senior offi cers or directors may nevertheless sometimes be misled or otherwise fail reasonably
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it receives and make further investigation if the information suggests problems149
– what a later case labelled ‘red fl ags’ – 150 or otherwise face possible liability to 
shareholders for losses from the corporation’s non-compliance with laws.151 In 
this later case, Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court (a higher court than 
the Chancery Court) not only affi rmed Caremark, it framed the Caremark duties 
as good faith obligations that implicated the duty of loyalty to shareholders. This 
marks a critical turn, as courts defer much less to decisions to directors involving 
the duty of loyalty compared to decisions challenged under the duty of care.152
However, the effect of the Caremark decision on director liability for corporate 
violations of the law is tempered in a number of respects. First, Delaware courts 
have indicated that they will defer to the business judgment of directors and 
management in how compliance systems are designed and how much information 
is channelled to directors.153 The tension between this business judgment deference 
and the language of Stone invoking ‘good faith’ and the duty of loyalty remains to 
be resolved in future cases. In any event, the requirement of compliance systems 
does not mean that the board must have detailed knowledge of all aspects of a 
corporation’s operations.154 Moreover, Caremark duties run to shareholders and 
do not create director liability to the government or third parties. Together, these 
limitations strongly suggest that a board could satisfy its Caremark duties without 
becoming actively involved enough in corporate operations to trigger liability to the 
government or third parties under veil piercing, direct participation or responsible 
corporate offi cer theories.
Nevertheless, federal securities laws serve as a backstop to corporate law duties; 
securities law increases the incentives and abilities of directors of public corporations 
to monitor the activities and potential legal violations of their corporations in two 
ways. First, securities law creates demand by directors for information about 
potential corporate misconduct; directors of public companies have a great incentive 
to monitor corporate operations due to federal securities laws that impose liability 
on directors for the accuracy of a company’s disclosure.155 In addition to general 
to detect acts material to the corporation’s compliance with the law. But it is important that the 
board exercise a good faith judgment that the corporation’s information and reporting system 
is in concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate information will come 
to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations, so that it may satisfy its 
responsibility. Ibid.
149  Ibid. See Sale, n. 146 above at 752–53. 
150  Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 at 364 (Del. 2006). 
151  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 370. 
152  Stone, 911 A.2d at 370; Sale, n. 146 above at 730. 
153  See n. 147 above.
154  Sale, n. 146 above at 732 citing Stone, 911 A.2d at 368. 
155  Of particular note, s. 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability on directors for any 
material inaccuracies in a corporation’s registration statement fi led with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and disclosed to investors. 15 USC § 77k(a)(2–3) (2008). 
 GERDING: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 329
antifraud rules, federal securities regulations require intensive disclosure about, 
among other things, a public company’s operations and legal risks.156 Therefore, 
in order to avail them of the due diligence defence to various forms of disclosure 
liability, directors must then reasonably inform themselves of potential misconduct 
and legal violations by the corporation.157
Second, recent securities laws have addressed the supply of information to 
directors regarding corporate misconduct. The 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act represented 
a signifi cant entry of federal law into corporate governance, historically the province 
of state law.158 The Act and SEC regulations promulgated under the Act addressed 
the supply of information to boards regarding corporate misconduct in several ways. 
Most notably, the Act and subsequent regulations mandated that public companies 
assess and certify the adequacy of their internal disclosure and control systems. 
Under section 302 of the Act, executive offi cers of publicly registered corporations 
are required to certify the adequacy of internal fi nancial reporting systems,159
and similarly, under section 404, management and auditors of those corporations 
are required to issue a report on the adequacy of internal control over fi nancial 
reporting.160
Section 404 has proven the most controversial provision in the Act, as many 
companies have complained about the expense of investigating and redesigning 
internal control systems without regard to the potential magnitude of fraud that must 
be interdicted.161 Beyond internal controls, the Sarbanes Oxley Act and regulations 
also include a set of reporting standards and whistleblower protections designed 
to encourage employees and agents of a public corporation (including lawyers) 
to report fraud ‘up the ladder’ in the corporation and ultimately to the board of 
directors.162
156  For example, public companies must disclose to investors pending legal proceedings. See
17 CFR § 229.103 (2007). 
157  For example, s. 11 offers directors a defence to liability if, after performing due diligence, 
they reasonably believed that the registration statement was materially accurate. 15 USC 
§ 77k(b). 
158  For an exploration of the linkages between federal securities laws and state corporate law 
duties before Sarbanes Oxley, including how securities law incorporated fi duciary duty 
concepts, see D.C. Langevoort, ‘The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and 
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability’ (2001) 89 Georgetown 
Law Journal, 797. For scholarly debate on the ‘federalization’ of corporate governance via 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act, see sources at n. 1 above. 
159  15 USC § 7241(a)(4)–(6) (2008) (requiring that the SEC pass regulations requiring 
certifi cations from executives on internal controls). 
160  15 USC § 7262 (2008) (requiring that the SEC pass regulations specifying information in the 
required, the reports). See also 17 CFR §§ 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274 (2007) (SEC 
rules responding to statutory mandate under ss 302 and 404). 
161  ‘Sarbanes Oxley: Five Years Under the Thumb’ (26 July 2007) Economist. 
162  E.g. 17 CFR § 205 (2007) (setting standards for conduct for attorneys appearing before the 
SEC). 
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Although the above provisions generally relate directly to fi nancial disclosure, 
legal risks beyond fi nancial fraud impact a company’s fi nancial reporting, and thus 
these laws and regulations can improve the fl ow of information to the board on legal 
compliance in general. 
7.5 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS
Whether corporate or securities law create optimal incentives for directors to 
monitor misconduct represents one of the most intense areas of scholarly and policy 
debate in US business law. This debate mirrors the questions posed earlier in Part 7 
on the impact of veil piercing, direct participation and responsible corporate offi cer 
standards on director behaviour. Again, the effects of different director liability rules 
on optimal monitoring and deterrence of corporate misconduct, risk-spreading, 
decision-making and delegation of decisions, and the market for directors remain 
open to empirical study. It may be extremely optimistic to expect conclusive answers 
to any of these questions in the near future.
Yet, it is striking that the phrasing of these questions, the structure of director 
liability rules in this chapter, and the way courts talk about these rules refl ect 
certain values embedded both in US corporate law and in the way corporate law 
intersects with public law. Effi ciency concerns take centre stage, and particularly 
concerns about effi ciency within the corporation. Shareholders occupy a privileged 
position in American law. Indeed, scholars have long remarked how corporate 
limited liability represents a form of subsidy paid by tort creditors to shareholders 
to encourage capital formation.163 So too does the rule structure that makes liability 
of directors for corporate misconduct relatively rare, a representation of an implicit 
high valuation of the economic activity generated by the corporate form compared 
to the costs borne by the public from torts and violations of environmental and other 
public laws.
163  L. Ribstein, ‘Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation’ (1991) 50 Maryland Law 
Review, 80, 94 (describing this as the ‘externalities hypothesis’). 
